Guest lecture by President of the Republic Tarja Halonen at the University of Stockholm 2.5.2000

(Check against delivery) AT THE CORE OF EUROPE AS A NON-PARTICIPANT IN MILITARY ALLIANCES - FINNISH THOUGHTS AND EXPERIENCES

Throughout history we Finns have been united in an endeavour to build our lives in peace, of our own free will, on our own terms. It has not always been easy here in the far recesses of the North, in the borderlands between East and West. We are not a nation of conquerors, but we have wanted to keep what is ours.

A characteristic feature of Finland ever since she gained independence has been a determination to remain uninvolved in international disputes – and especially armed conflicts.

The Second World War was a severe ordeal for our country and people, just as it was for most of the nations of Europe. Yet we avoided much of the worst, probably due largely to our unyielding will to be free. Of all the European countries that were involved in the Second World War, Britain was the only one other than ourselves to escape a large part of its territory being occupied. We have also managed to keep our democratic institutions functioning for all of the time that we have been independent. The only other countries in Continental Europe that have been able to do that for the same period are Sweden and Switzerland. Although bitter memories of the war live on, we have been able, by openly discussing the past, to free our resources and make them available to work for the future. Finland is today one of the world’s most prosperous and safest countries.

Finland’s policy of neutrality in the post-Second World War period grew from the starting points of a war having had an unfortunate outcome, but independence having been won. We tried to ensure for our country the best possible framework in which to operate in a world where antagonism between the superpowers set the tone. We wanted to remain a western democracy under the rule of law and rebuild our war-ravaged country. We also wanted to strengthen our traditional cooperation with Scandinavia and more broadly with all of the states in the world. At the same time we tried to build the smoothest-possible relations of cooperation with our eastern neighbour the Soviet Union, especially in the economic sphere. For a country recovering from the damage the war had caused, becoming a member of the UN in 1955 was an important step towards international cooperation and at the same time into the awareness of the outside world. We were not a Soviet satellite, although we had to balance like a tightrope walker between our mighty neighbour’s aspirations and our own goals.

Close cooperation in the context of the Nordic countries came naturally to us both for historical reasons and given our shared world of values. Our joining the Nordic Council in 1956 was an important step. It fully empowered us to act within the framework of this international community, the nature of which did not, however, bind us to supranational decision making. Our Nordic ties were of considerable importance also when we began building links to countries further afield within the framework of development cooperation programmes in the latter half of the 1960s.

Since Finland had decided to continue on the path of a Nordic market economy, the process of integration in western Europe also presented us with new opportunities. With deepening cooperation initially proceeding along two separate lines, Finland – in common with the other Nordic countries – was involved with the European Free Trade Association from the beginning, retaining well into the 1980s the associated member status that we had chosen for political reasons. We concluded a free-trade agreement with the European Communities in 1973. At the same time we made comparable trade arrangements also with the Soviet Union and the Comecon countries.

Our goal in political cooperation after we had become a member of the UN was to develop the preconditions for cooperative security, especially in Europe. In the background was our own experience as the ripple effects of crises in Central Europe were felt in the northern part of the continent in 1958-61 as well as the unease that the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 had created. For Finland, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with its Helsinki summit in summer 1975 was a means of adding stability to the situation in Europe and at the same time providing a noteworthy demonstration of our active policy of neutrality. The ten Helsinki Principles are still the cornerstone of cooperation between the states of Europe.

A characteristic detail in the integration policy that Finland pursued during the Cold War era was a desire more to increase dialogue and cooperation between different countries or even ideological groupings than to strive by means of norms to raise the level of democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law in Europe. That probably accounts for the lesser esteem accorded the Council of Europe in comparison with general political organisations, on the one hand, and economic integration, on the other, in those days.

Finland applied for membership of the Council of Europe only six months before Hungary. The timing of our accession was good in the sense that the Council was just then beginning to evolve into a genuinely pan-European organisation. It did indeed rapidly become an effective instrument for consolidating democracy, human rights and the principles of the rule of law throughout the continent.

I make so bold as to say that since we Finns joined, we have been working very actively and visibly for the principles of the Council and to add to its authority.

A new operating environment for foreign policy opened up for the whole of Europe when the Berlin Wall collapsed peacefully a decade ago. That was especially so for Finland, which had been squeezed between East and West. We had to define the anchor points of our foreign policy in a situation where our freedom of action had become greater than it had been at any time in our seven decades as an independent state. We got moving quickly, but with small steps. In autumn 1990, after the Four Powers agreement on the reunification of Germany, we unilaterally freed ourselves of the Paris Peace Treaty’s provisions concerning Germany and arms procurements and then the following year we negotiated with our eastern neighbour Russia a new agreement suiting the times.

It came as rather a surprise to us Finns when Sweden announced in 1991 that she was applying for membership of the EC. The Swedish announcement helped speed up our own decision in the matter, but just how much is a question to which the answer would be only a guess. Nor was there then a clear perception of how deeply the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe longed for integration or of the growing importance of the European Union. However, we Finns acted quickly and cool-headedly under the circumstances; only eight months after the Swedish decision – and nearly two years before the entry into force of the European Economic Area agreement – we submitted our own membership application to the EC.

What was and is decisive is our determination, rooted in experience, to participate broadly in cooperation with countries in Europe that share our values. Our history has taught us the dangers of being alone and of being left to fend for ourselves. The EU is a close association of independent states, which radiates stability far beyond its own territory; in other words, an essential place for Finland to be.

We have energetically thrown ourselves into the work of building the EU. Our stint in the Presidency in the latter semester of last year was a big challenge, but also an important lesson in cooperation. We saw that even a small country that has done its homework diligently can make its voice heard in the EU. Without a doubt, our influence on world affairs of importance to us is greater as a member of the EU than it would be if we had remained outside.

When we acceded to membership in 1995 Finland had to accept the EU in the form into which it had evolved up to that point. It was natural and in accordance with our interests for us to join also the Economic and Monetary Union. In the early 1990s we had been taught a lesson about the vulnerability of an indebted and small country’s currency. Naturally, we would have liked Denmark and Sweden to join the EMU at the same time as us, but we did not hesitate to make the decision that we regarded as right for us, even though we were the only Nordic country to join. Already now we can see that the decision has had a stabilising effect on our economy.

In Finland as elsewhere there is an ongoing debate as to which is better from the perspective of a small country: close or loose integration? Making a rapid assessment of the matter, it might seem that the loose option is preferable. The decisive factor is, of course, democracy. If it is preserved, small countries are more centrally involved in decision making in a close union and the collective effect is greater. A loose union, by contrast, gives its members more freedoms but, as we all know, bigger countries have better opportunities to exercise them. When I speak of a close union I do not, however, mean a federal state. The EU is an association of independent states, and there is nothing wrong with that.

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) states that the EU’s common foreign and security policy covers all questions associated with the security of the Union, including a common defence policy to be defined over the long term, and which could eventually lead to a common defence. This is the development vista that Finland accepted when acceding to membership. It is important to note that there is no agreement to create a common defence. It is only a possibility. In the manner typical of the EU, documenting a possibility of this kind reflects the member states’ divergent views on the course of development. What is essential from our point of view is that Finland is now, as a member, party to decisions concerning the future development of the EU. Decisions with a bearing on military cooperation require unanimity in the EU.

Some member states would like to develop the EU into an organisation with a collective defence function. This aspiration was strongly in evidence during the last intergovernmental conference, ultimately in the form of a proposal put forward jointly by seven countries and calling for the Western European Union to be absorbed into the EU in three stages. However, this did not suit all of the NATO members, nor those which do not belong to military alliances.

Instead, Finland and Sweden considered it necessary to develop the EU’s capabilities in the sphere of crisis management. There was and is a real need for this. In June 1996, when I was Minister for Foreign Affairs, my Swedish counterpart Lena Hjelm-Wallén and I wrote a joint newspaper article on the need to develop the EU’s capability in the area of crisis management. The EU could participate in crisis management, also using military means, but yet without turning into a military alliance. This solution was eventually incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty, in which provision was also made for developing cooperation in the defence equipment industry. In the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty, it was agreed that the implementation of military crisis management decided on by the EU would be entrusted to the WEU, which in turn could call on NATO for resources when demanding operations needed to be carried through.

Britain’s new active European policy added momentum to the development of the EU’s work in the field of crisis management. Only a year and a half after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, Britain and France proposed in St. Malo that the crisis-management functions which it had been agreed would be implemented with the aid of the WEU should be transferred to the EU itself. All EU members agreed to this and at the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 Finland was given a mandate to develop the capability and structures that would be needed for decisions, planning and direction in relation to crisis management. A decision to develop the EU’s capability in the field of civilian crisis management was taken in the same conjunction. The fact that the Amsterdam Treaty had been in force for just over a month at that point is an indication of the pace at which development was forging ahead.

The Union agreed at the Helsinki Summit to undertake practical measures to develop its capacity for crisis management using both military and civilian means. Development has indeed been rapid since then: the interim bodies agreed on in Helsinki have begun their work in Brussels, and new cooperation arrangements and bodies have been and are being created in order to make civilian crisis management more effective. Modalities of work are establishing themselves, and further results can be expected already at the Feira summit.

We must ensure that the precise planning and implementation procedures that military crisis management requires are at the same time adding effectiveness to the Union’s ability to respond to the challenges of crisis situations with all of the means at its disposal: political, economic, civilian and military. We must continue to analyse the causes of crises in order to be able to prevent them. We likewise need more information on how crises are being managed.

Military means of crisis management would be a last resort in the event of other means having proved inadequate. This will certainly have the effect of intensifying efforts already in the earlier stages of a crisis – after all, resorting to military resources is ultimately the most expensive and least desirable solution for all parties.

It is of paramount importance that alongside the EU’s capacity for military crisis management we also develop its capability on the civilian side. Recent crises demonstrate clearly that civilian measures, such as police work, helping to build up a judicial system and providing rescue services, are emphatically prerequisites for recovery from crises and bringing about and supporting peaceful development.

As is the case on the military side, the EU need not do everything in the category of civilian crisis management on its own. The UN and its special agencies, the OSCE and the Council of Europe are its natural cooperation partners.

I shall say no more about civilian crisis management now, but I urge you all to read the excellent article by foreign ministers Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja that was published in both Finland and Sweden last Sunday [30.4.2000].

The brisk development that began with the St. Malo declaration would not have been possible without a clear distinction having been made in it between military crisis management and a common defence. It is, however, true that in the broad sense of the concept, military crisis management often serves the security interests of the countries participating in the operation.

Finland’s defence choice is founded on our own assessment of our region’s security needs. We take the view that the present arrangements best promote stability and security in Finland, our immediate geographical region and Europe. And since we are committed to defending our own territory, we naturally bear the burdens that stem from it.

Participation in military cooperation in crisis management is based on common responsibility and does not presuppose membership of a military alliance. By contrast, there is a need to develop a capacity for cooperation with the organisations within the frameworks of which preparations for military crisis management are made. Finland cooperates to a significant degree in the field of crisis management with both the other Nordic countries and the UN and WEU, and in the future will do so also within an EU framework. Cooperation within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme is also important to us. NATO has major significance for the security of Europe and a matter of central importance from our perspective is that 11 EU countries are members of the alliance and their military resources are within the NATO framework.

Since we do want to shoulder our responsibility for peacekeeping, it lies in our interests to be closely involved in planning concerning it. Only in that way can we have our views considered and achieve the result that is the best possible from our perspective. It has already been seen in the Balkans that the Finns have a lot to give in the development of peacekeeping. Based as it is mainly on a voluntary reserve, our system guarantees that Finnish peacekeeping forces also possess a wide variety of civilian skills, which have been of great benefit in, especially, the confused circumstances of Kosovo. Besides carrying out their actual tasks, our soldiers there have had to double as everything from police officer to carpenter.

One sometimes hears it said that it would be practical if all of the EU member states were also militarily allied with each other. From one perspective, certainly. On the other hand, it would increase the risk of the EU and NATO being seen as intertwined organisations. The Union and NATO have different memberships and different tasks. I do not see a need to add a mutual defence obligation to the EU’s functions. Experiences in the Balkans provide much food for thought on this theme.

We are developing the EU’s capacity for crisis management: it is equally important to be interested in those EU members who do not belong to NATO as it has been to be interested in the NATO members who are not in the EU. Now there is a need to be active. It is the most active countries who drive development on. It is also true that these active countries largely determine the main framework for future development. The development of a common security and defence policy for the EU is such an important matter for Finland that we are safeguarding our interests through active participation.

Whether to remain uninvolved in military alliances or to join one is a decision separate from military crisis management. It is a decision that is completely up to us. As a fully-fledged member of the EU, are participating in developing its crisis management without being part of a military alliance. We have already shown that our contribution to shouldering the burden of crisis management and peacekeeping is relatively greater than our size would require. I do not accept demands that countries not belonging to a military alliance should provide some specific "proof" that they are good members by doing more on the crisis-management side than countries that are in an alliance. Finland, like the other EU members that are not militarily allied, has a positive effect on the stability of Europe.

We have travelled a long road from the difficult position in which we found ourselves after the Second World War to our present active membership of the EU. Our status is better, stronger and more secure than ever in the past.

Non-participation in military alliances and playing an active part in European decision making accord with our national interests. We have shown through our own deeds that a country can have a role at the core of Europe without having to belong to a military alliance. We intend to continue pursuing this policy.