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Distinguished guests, dear participants in the National Defence Course,
The purpose of national defence courses is to bring together professionals from across various sectors of comprehensive security and to enhance cooperation between different sectors of society both in normal conditions and in times of crisis.
We have long talked about how this model fosters resilience and creates conditions necessary for the implementation of comprehensive security. And rightly so. We have discussed less, however, is that this approach also has a deterrent effect.
The course starting today is the 258th of its kind. It begins in highly different circumstances compared to some of its predecessors, such as the 158th course, which took place at the turn of the millennium. Back then, we lived in an era marked by optimism and the notion of the “end of history”. Many of us strongly believed that all of the world’s nearly 200 nations would revert towards a combination of democracy, social market economy, and globalisation. And that it would guarantee peace and stability across the globe.
That is not how things turned out. Today, we live in an era of strategic competition. In a situation where the global order is in flux and instability prevails. We feel pressure from multiple directions. Russia is waging a war of aggression in Ukraine and engaging in a hybrid campaign in Europe. The United States is acting in ways we are not used to, and there is no return to the past.
Over the course of the next three and a half weeks, you will have an opportunity to reflect on what all this means for Finland.
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Today, I would like to give you more food for thought and talk about two concepts that have not yet been analysed to death in the Finnish security policy debate: deterrence and escalation management. In my closing remarks, I will talk about the meaning of strategic culture. First, deterrence.
In Finland, discussing defence and its implementation has in many ways come naturally to us. At times, we discuss individual capabilities and weapon systems in great detail.
The debate on deterrence is more recent. Even the concept itself is new to us. During the Cold War, we were more likely to talk about ‘restraint’. The word ‘deterrence’ is somewhat challenging, and its Finnish equivalent, ‘pelote’, literally denotes something intended to inspire fear. Yet, or perhaps precisely for that reason, it is important that we discuss deterrence openly and make clear that it as an integral part of our defence solution.
The purpose of deterrence is to ensure that we never find ourselves in a situation where we have to defend ourselves.
Discussion of deterrence is not about sabre-rattling. It is not about provocation or wanton escalation. Quite the opposite. The purpose of deterrence is to preserve the status quo, to ensure that the prevailing security order is not challenged.
Finland’s history offers several examples of what can happen to a frontline state when the security order in Europe fails. These periods are often described from a Finnish perspective, as if they were isolated events: the Finnish War, the Åland War, the events of 1918 or the Winter War and the Continuation War, perhaps even the Lapland War. In reality, however, they were all part of wider European developments shaped by conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, and the First and Second World Wars.
At these turning points in history, Finland had very limited opportunities to influence the broader course of events in Europe. We may even have sought to stay out of these conflicts, hoping, usually in vain, that they would not reach Finland.
Today, the situation is different. We are members of the European Union and NATO and engage in close defence cooperation with our partners and allies. Our NATO membership in particular is central to our deterrence.
We are not alone. And just as importantly, through our actions and initiative, we can help strengthen both deterrence and the European security order.
For a frontline state, strengthening deterrence must always be a priority. Passivity is not an option.
Like comprehensive security, deterrence is a joint endeavour.
Our foreign and security policy stands at the forefront of deterrence. Diplomacy is its spearhead. It provides the framework for our security policy dialogue. The central task of our foreign and security policy is to build alliances and strengthen the unity of Europe and the West.
At the same time, it provides a framework for discussions with Russia. Against this backdrop, the Norwegian Prime Minister and I had a telephone conversation with the President of Russia last week. Our message was clear. We communicated firmly, but without provocation. We made it clear that our support for Ukraine is unwavering. This kind of communication must also be viewed as an element of deterrence and of efforts to uphold strategic stability.
Deterrence is fundamentally about three things: capabilities, credibility and communication.
Building a stronger deterrent requires that we examine what military capabilities we need to work on and, for example, which NATO activities we should participate in to strengthen our collective deterrence.
At a time marked by transatlantic burden-shifting, we must consider deterrence more extensively and thoroughly than before. The role of the United States is diminishing. Europe must rely increasingly on its own capabilities and be able to manage escalation independently.
We are stronger together than we are alone. The ongoing cooperation on territorial surveillance between the Finnish Air Force and Navy and their Swedish counterparts demonstrates that, today, we are able to operate together with our Allies in areas where we previously had to rely solely on our own capabilities.
The extended deterrence provided by the United States also brings Finland under the protection of the nuclear deterrent. In this context, I would also note that Finland has joined the French nuclear deterrence initiative, and that work to implement this cooperation was launched at the official level last week. In-depth discussions with a nuclear-armed state such as France also give us new insights into how great powers assess the consequences of their actions in the current security environment. This cooperation will enhance our understanding and, above all, strengthen our collective deterrence. At this stage, the full scope of our cooperation is still taking shape. We will carefully assess the implications of the various options before making any decisions. What is certain is that we take this cooperation, like all efforts to strengthen our defence, seriously.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Finland is a country where we mean what we say and do what we promise.
When our words and actions are aligned and mutually reinforcing, they strengthen the credibility of our deterrence.
This also why military exercises, our ability to deliver host nation support and our capacity to increase defence industrial production are all the more important. They demonstrate our capabilities in practice.
A good example of deterrence communication was also the speech given by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Alexus G. Grynkewich, in Warsaw three weeks ago. He outlined how NATO has prepared for potential aggression. The messages were carefully considered and reflected the Alliance’s ability to deliver in practice.
Let me also remind you that Finland’s comprehensive security model includes an additional and unique layer of deterrence thinking that is exceptional in the world. Our understanding of deterrence is not limited to military measures aimed at imposing costs on an adversary or preventing it from achieving its objectives. Our approach to deterrence and defence is broader than that. Our starting point is We start from the premise that the vital functions of society must be safeguarded under all circumstances. In this respect, Finland is a pioneer.
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The second area I would like to address is escalation management.
We know that crises, once they erupt, can escalate in unexpected ways. Escalation management refers to our understanding of the nature of crises and conflicts, and our ability to manage them and how they evolve.
As with deterrence, escalation management is about both preparing for the future and being able to respond to a range of situations, including unexpected ones. It can help us create opportunities and room for manoeuvre.
Today, escalation management is taking place in an exceptionally complex environment. While hybrid influencing and hybrid attacks have always been part of interstate relations and conflicts, technological advances, the digitalisation of societies, growing interdependencies and changes in social relations have led to an increase in hybrid threats.
Russia is waging a war of aggression in Ukraine and has, as a result, also stepped up its hostile actions elsewhere in Europe. It is testing limits and seeking to influence European countries to withdraw their support to Ukraine. That will not happen.
Yet we find ourselves in a situation where we must continue to invest in defence, preparedness and security. We must also be prepared to live with a considerable degree of uncertainty.
Let me try to sum up our approach to this situation in the spirit of values-based realism. Finland will always act in accordance with the basic pillars of our society, guided by democracy and the rule of law.
At the same time, we must recognise the ways in which our society is being threatened today. We must create the means to ensure the continuity of society under all circumstances. We must safeguard our critical infrastructure, societal resilience, and our decision-making capability. And we must make hostile actors pay a price for their actions.
It is not enough to recognise our strengths. We must also identify our weaknesses and address any shortcomings. This is the mindset and approach I encourage all of you on this course to adopt.
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This brings me to my conclusions.
Whether we are building security or managing various crises, our actions always reflect our strategic culture.
Similarly, the discussion on deterrence and escalation management is also part of our strategic culture.
While some discussions are held behind closed doors, there is also a need for public debate to ensure that citizens understand how our operating environment is changing and how our own activities are developing. How deterrence is being built. It is my hope that this will ensure that we have our citizens’ support for current and future solutions.
Finland has a strong legacy of strategic culture, but it, too, must evolve with the times.
Let me also remind you that we are building and shaping this strategic culture together with other European countries. While different countries often have different starting points, not least for historical reasons, the global situation is forcing us to bring them together.
This makes the current efforts to update the EU Security Strategy all the more important. The strategy serves as our shared view of the security environment and the measures required.
Dear participants,
We are well prepared and we have done our homework on history. But we cannot afford to become complacent or rest on our laurels. Comprehensive security requires our attention every day. Deterrence must continue to evolve if it is to remain effective.
This work must be carried out both nationally and together with our partners and allies. Together, we are strong.
We should take nothing for granted. The world order is in a state of transition and will never stand still. We must understand these changes and actively seek to shape them. That is how we will prevail.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I wish you every success in the course ahead. The 258th Finnish National Defence Course.
